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Van Kessel Gordon
RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN CRIMINAL POST-CONVICTION
REVIEW PROCEEDINGS
Recently, in Douglas v. California,' the United States Supreme Court held
that the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment requires states to
appoint counsel for indigents upon request on their first appeal as of right from
a criminal conviction.2 Appellants Douglas and Meyes were convicted of thirteen
felonies. They appealed as of right to a California district court of appeal and re-
quested the appointment of counsel. Under the California rule for appointment
of counsel on appeal, the appellate court could decline to appoint counsel only if,
after an independent investigation of the record, it concluded that counsel would
be of no value to either the defendant or the court.3 The appellate court in Douglas,
after such ex parte examination of the record, had declined to appoint counsel for
the appellants, stating that no good whatever would be served by appointment.
The United States Supreme Court reversed, declaring that "where the merits of
the one and only appeal an indigent has as of right are decided without benefit
of counsel ... an unconstitutional line has been drawn between rich and poor."4
The Court relied on cases beginning with Griffin v. Illinois5 which held that states
cannot foreclose an effective appeal from a defendant who is unable to pay a filing
fee or purchase a transcript. 6 The purpose of this Comment is to show the imme-
diate effect of Douglas on state and federal appellate proceedings, to explore the
possible effects of the decision in collateral attack proceedings, and to discuss the
problems created by the demand for assistance of counsel.
1372 U.S. 353 (1963) (6-to-3 decision).2 Prior to Douglas the duty imposed on the courts to appoint counsel for indigents did not
extend beyond the trial level and was developed through the sixth amendment for the federal
courts and the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment for the states. The sixth amend-
ment imposes on the federal courts the duty to appoint counsel for indigents in all criminal
proceedings unless the indigent waives his right to counsel. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458
(1938). Johnson, however, was seen as only guaranteeing the right to assistance of counsel at
the trial and having no application to appeal. Thompson v. Johnson, 160 F.2d 374 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 331 U.S. 853 (1947).
It was first held that due process only required states to afford counsel to indigents at the
trial if lack of counsel would result in "a denial of fundamental fairness, shocking to the
universal sense of justice ... ." and so prevent a fair trial. Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 462
(1942). The application of this flexible standard meant that the need for counsel had to be
shown in each particular case. This gave rise to much litigation. See generally BEANEY, RIGHT
TO COUNSEL iN Aa RiC.AN COURTS (1955); Kamisar, Betts v. Brady Twenty Years Later,
61 McH. L. Rxv. 219 (1962).
It was not until Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), that the guarantee of counsel
in the sixth amendment was held to be a fundamental right to a fair trial and so a necessary
element of due process in felony cases. Thus, the states as well as the federal courts are now
required to appoint counsel for an indigent at the trial in serious criminal cases unless he waives
his right to counsel.
3 People v. Hyde, 51 Cal. 2d 152, 154, 331 P.2d 42, 43 (1958).
4 Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 357 (1963).
5 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
6 The right to appeal from a criminal conviction in both state and federal courts is not
required by due process. McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684 (1895) ; cf. Griffin v. Illinois, 351
U.S. 12 (1956). But when appellate review is offered, the procedure must conform to the re-
quirements of due process and equal protection. Dowd v. United States ex rel. Cook, 340 U.S.
206 (1951) ; Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196 (1948) ; Cochran v. Kansas, 316 U.S. 255 (1942) ;
cf. Ortega v. Ragen, 216 F.2d 561 (7th Cir. 1954). In Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956),
the Supreme Court held that equal protection requires states to give indigents equal access to
appellate review by providing an adequate transcript for review of alleged trial errors. Under
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FFECT OF DOUGLAS ON APPELLATE PROCEEDINGS
A. Initial State Appeals
The immediate effect of Douglas on state direct review proceedings is to
require appointment of counsel for indigents upon request for their first appeal
as of right from a criminal conviction, regardness of the merits of the appeal7 and
presumably regardless of the seriousness of the offense.8 Since the indigents in
Douglas had requested counsel and the Court does not state that a request is un-
necessary, the holding does not appear to require an affirmative offer of counsel
as is required at the trial.9
The major problem raised by Douglas concerns frivolous appeals. Apparently
Douglas allows states to screen appeals for merit by entertaining motions to dis-
miss before considering briefs or oral argument as long as rich and poor appel-
lants are treated alike.' 0 To the extent, however, that state practice is to review
all paid appeals after briefing and oral argument regardless of merit, the indigent
must also be afforded the full benefit of counsel's briefing and oral argument."
Illinois law, only the mandatory or common law record, consisting of indictment, arraignment,
plea, trial and judgment, were automatically brought up for review. Most reversals on appeal
are based on errors not discoverable in the mandatory record, such as errors in the instructions
to the jury or comments on the evidence. To bring any additional record up for review, a bill
of exceptions is necessary and this is usually impossible to produce without a full transcript.
Since the appellant was required to purchase this additional transcript, the indigent was effec-
tively foreclosed from a meaningful review automatically given to those who could afford the
transcript. See Brief for Petitioner, pp. 12-15, Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956). The Griffin
principle was applied retroactively. Eskridge v. Washintgon State Board of Prison Terms and
Paroles, 357 U.S. 214 (1958). Cf. Patterson v. Medberry, 290 F.2d 275 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
368 U.S. 839 (1961). Justice Frankfurter believed that Griffin should speak only prospectively
because of practical concerns of administration. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 25 (1956)
(separate opinion).
The equality of access principle was subsequently applied to other post-conviction remedies
of: (1) petitioning for a discretionary appeal after one appeal has already been considered,
Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252 (1959) ; see Douglas v. Green, 363 U.S. 192 (1960) ; (2) petition-
ing for a writ of habeas corpus, Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708 (1961) ; see Barber v. Gladden,
210 Ore. 46, 298 P.2d 986 (1956) ; and (3) appealing from a denial of a writ of coram nobis,
Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477 (1963); accord, McCrary v. Indiana, 364 U.S. 277 (1960).
7 See Application of Shepherd, ....... A.CA. ....... 32 Cal. Rptr. 131 (1963); In re Miller,
........ A.C.A ......... 30 Cal. Rptr. 784 (1963); Donald v. State, 154 So. 2d 357 (Fla.App. 1963);
cf. McIntosh v. Commonwealth, 368 S.W.2d 331 (Ky. 1963). In Vasquez v. District Court,
59 A.C. 606, 381 P.2d 203, 30 Cal. Rptr. 467 (1963), the California Supreme Court issued a writ
of mandamus compelling an appellate court to appoint counsel for an indigent without any
prior consideration of the merits.
8 The Court did not indicate that the seriousness of the offense was a controlling consider-
ation. Compare Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), concerning the right to counsel at
the trial.
9 See McIntosh v. Commonwealth, 368 S.W.2d 331 (Ky. 1963), holding that although
due process requires that indigents must be advised of their right to counsel at the trial, equal
protection requires appointment of counsel only upon request and does not require that an
offer be made.
1 0In People v. Wallace, 217 A.C.A. 489, 31 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963), the court appointed
counsel and then upon motion dismissed the appeal as frivolous without a full hearing. The
court indicated it was following federal in forma pauperis practice, citing Ellis v. United States,
356 U.S. 674 (1963).
1 This is the requirement for current federal practice. See note 30 infra and accompany-
ing text.
.97119631 COMMENTS
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Providing this full representation for all indigents regardless of the merit of the
appeal raises problems when the appeal is so frivolous that the appointed counsel
can find no merit upon which to base a tenable argument. Should counsel be re-
quired to serve after he has investigated the record, examined his client and other
witnesses and found that there is no merit in the appeal or should the court be
able to dismiss counsel and decide on the merits with only the aid of the transcript
and pro se briefs? An appointed counsel should not be required to form arguments
which he believes to be completely baseless.1 2 Yet an appellant who can afford
to hire counsel has the opportunity to search for one who believes he can present
some worthy arguments. Douglas gives no express answer to the question of
whether equal protection is satisfied by the appointment of one counsel or whether
some further effort to provide the indigent with a counsel willing to accept the case
is necessary. The Court, however, contrasted California practice with the virtues
of the federal practice of appointing counsel in every case for an appeal from the
trial court's denial of leave to appeal without costs. If the Court here implies that
federal practice is sufficient to comply with the demands of equal protection, then
it should be noted that federal courts can discharge appointed counsel without
appointing another if, after investigation, counsel finds no argument he can raise
on appeal and the appellate court agrees with his view of the case. 18 Moreover,
since the main inequality aimed at in Douglas is the indigent's lack of benefit of
counsel's examination of the record, research of the law, and marshalling of argu-
ments,14 it is doubtful that when an indigent has been given this benefit through
one appointed counsel, failure to appoint other counsel will be branded as invidious
discrimination. 15 Appointment of a second counsel should not be required by equal
protection but should be left to the discretion of the court. Equal protection surely
does not demand that a court find counsel willing to accept an appeal in every
case, since it should not be assumed that hired counsel can find appealable merit
in every paid appeal. A court, of course, is pre-judging the merits, but with the
aid of counsel. Appointing only one counsel seems to be the present California
practice.16 Appellate courts, however, may in their discretion go further than the
12 See People v. Brown, 55 Cal. 2d 64, 69, 357 P.2d 1072, 1975, 9 Cal. Rptr. 816, 819 (1960)
(separate opinion of Traynor, J.).
13 Ellis v. United States, 356 U.S. 674 (1958) ; Douglas, In Forma Pauperis Practice in
the United States, 2 N.H.BJ. 5, 7 (1959); see generally Boskey, The Right to Counsel in
Appellate Proceedings, 45 MnN. L. Rxv. 783, 794-96 (1961).
14 372 U.S. at 358.
15 The Court in Douglas noted that states can provide for some differences consistently
with due process and equal protection. Id. at 356-57.
16E.g., People v. Chavez, 218 A.CA. 754, 32 Cal. Rptr. 450 (1963); People v. Welch,
218 A.C.A. 440, 31 Cal. Rptr. 926 (1963) ; People v. Adams, 218 A.C.A. 438, 32 Cal. Rptr. 403
(1963); People v. Price, 218 A.C.A. 348, 32 Cal. Rptr. 599 (1963); People v. Scott, 218 A.C.A.
133, 31 Cal. Rptr. 925 (1963). The appellate court reviews the transcript and does not consider
the report of appointed counsel as binding on the defendant or as limiting the court's consider-
ation of the case. People v. Taylor, 218 A.C.A. 339,32 Cal. Rptr. 384 (1963).
Practice differs, however, and some courts usually appoint second counsel. Interview with
Presiding Justice, California District Court of Appeal, First District, Division One, in San
Francisco, October, 1963, and with Presiding Justice, California District Court of Appeal,
First District, Division Three, in San Francisco, October, 1963. In the absence of any specified
duty, perhaps the best guide would be the federal practice outlined above. The appellate court
could still appoint second counsel in its discretion if it disagreed with the opinion of first
counsel or if the seriousness of the sentence imposed warranted extremely close attention to
the appeal.
[Vol. 51:970
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Constitution requires and may find it advantageous in some cases to apoint a sec-
ond counsel to assure that there is no possible basis for appeal that can be raised.17
Furthermore, appointed counsel should always be required to act principally as
an advocate for the indigent and not as amicus curiae to the court.'8 Such rep-
resentation will reduce the need to appoint second counsel.
B. Federal Appeals
Although Douglas applies directly only to the states, it will no doubt have an
effect on the federal practice of appointing counsel on appeal. Although the Con-
stitution does not apply equal protection explicitly to federal action, the guar-
antee of equal protection has been applied to the federal government through the
due process clause of the fifth amendment.' 9 Moreover, Douglas rested on the
guarantees of fair procedure inherent in due process as well as on the equal pro-
tection clause. 20 Because a direct appeal from a district court's judgment of con-
viction is a matter of right,21 the type of proceeding is the same as that encoun-
tered in Douglas.
Through the in forma pauperis statute,22 Congress has empowered the federal
courts to request an attorney to represent an indigent and to authorize any action
or proceeding for an indigent, including an appeal, without payment of fees, costs,
or security. Congress, however, also adopted a system of screening appeals by
providing that an appeal may not be taken in forma pauperis if the trial court
certifies that it is not taken in good faith. 3 Good faith is determined solely by the
merits of an appeal, and so the same court that convicts and sentences the indi-
gent is required to make an evaluation of the appeal. If the trial court grants
leave to appeal in forma pauperis by certifying that the appeal is taken in good
faith, then counsel is probably appointed25 and the appeal is docketed in the court
17 In one California appellate court, out of fifteen second counsel appointed during one
term, two got reversals. Interview with Justice Peters, Associate Justice, California Supreme
Court, in San Francisco, September, 1963. This means that two out of fifteen appointed coun-
sels were wrong in their judgment of the case.
Is The federal courts demand the role of advocacy from appointed counsel. It is stressed
that he should not act as a friend of the court but should tell the court the appeal is without
merit only when he has in good faith done all reasonably possible to find grounds for appeal.
See authorities cited note 13 supra.
"D In Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954), the Court stated that "the 'equal protection
of the law' is a more explicit safeguard of prohibited unfairness than 'due process of law,' and,
therefore, we do not imply that the two are always interchangable phrases. But, as this Court
has recognized, discrimination may be so unjustifiable as to be violative of due process."
Id. at 499. See Hyser v. Reed, 318 F.2d 225 (D.C. Cir. 1963) (separate opinion). Cf. Coppedge
v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 446-47 (1962). See generally Antieau, Equal Protection Outside
the Clause, 40 CAr=r. L. REv. 362 (1952).
.20372 U.S. at 360-61 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
2128 U.S.C. §§ 1291, 1294 (1948); FED. R. Cmm. P. 37(a); see Coppedge v. United States,
369 U.S. 438, 441 (1962).
22 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (1948), as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (Supp. 1959).
23 Ibid.
24 Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438 (1962) ; Ellis v. United States, 356 U.S. 674
(1958).25 Although the United States Supreme Court has not specifically held that such appoint-
ment by the trial court is required, there is no reason for distinguishing between situations in
which the trial court grants leave to appeal in forma pauperis and where the appellate court
has granted the opportunity. When the court of appeals grants leave to proceed in forma
pauperis and considers the merits of the appeal, counsel must be appointed. See Coppedge v.
United States, 369 U.S. 438 (1962).
19631
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of appeals for consideration on the merits. If the trial court denies leave to appeal
in forma pauperis, the indigent is foreclosed from an appeal because of the re-
quired fees. The trial court's decision, however, is reviewable before the court of
appeals, 26 and it is well settled that the sixth amendment imposes on the federal
courts a requirement to appoint counsel for indigents, upon request, for such
review.
2 7
The United States Supreme Court has shown concern over inequality in treat-
ment of indigents after counsel has been appointed. The Court has dictated the
standards to be used by the courts of appeals on such review in an effort to equal-
ize the treatment of rich and poor appellants. It has declared that in evaluating
the trial court's application of the good faith test the court of appeals must not
interpret the test as requiring a preliminary showing of any minimum degree of
merit, but should regard it as the equivalent of the test used in considering a
motion to dismiss a paid appeal as frivolous;28 appeal in forma pauperis must be
allowed if there is any issue presented "not clearly frivolous." 29 In order to assure
complete equality of treatment, the same benefit of counsel should be afforded
the indigent before decision on the in forma pauperis appeal as is allowed the
wealthy appellant before the motion to dismiss is acted upon. In Coppedge v.
United States" the United States Supreme Court required such a practice. The
Court said that if it were the practice of the courts of appeals to defer rulings on
motions to dismiss until after considerations of the record, briefs, and oral argu-
ments, then the indigent must be afforded the same procedural rights and the
courts must consider the briefs and arguments of appointed counsel before decid-
ing whether to grant a free appeal. Since it now seems to be the general practice
of the courts of appeal to defer such rulings as to paid appeals,8 ' the indigent in
nearly all cases should be granted the full benefit of counsel's briefing and oral
argument.
32
Although the United States Supreme Court has apparently provided in these
procedures for appointment of counsel which would satisfy Douglas' requirements,
26 See statute cited note 22 suPra; Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438 (1962).
27 Johnson v. United States, 352 U.S. 565 (1957). Cf. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353
(1963); Robinson v. United States, 304 F.2d 805 (8th Cir. 1962); United States v. Mallison,
250 F.2d 792 (2d Cir. 1957).
28 Ellis v. United States, 356 U.S. 674-75 (1958). The requirement is considered to be
a result of statutory interpretation and not of constitutional demand. See Hyser v. Reed, 318
F.2d 225 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
29 Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 446 (1962).
30 Ibid.
3 1 E.g., Keinington v. United States, 307 F.2d 632 (D.C. Cir. 1962) ; Robinson v. United
States, 304 F.2d 805 (8th Cir. 1962). But see Hill v. United States, 294 F.2d 562 (8th Cir. 1961).
"The virtual non-existence of reported cases in which a criminal appeal has been dis-
missed as frivolous suggests strongly that virtually every defendant convicted in a federal court
can now have that conviction reviewed by a Court of Appeals." Ehrenhaft, Are the Paupers
Pampered? Indigent Appellants in the Federal Courts, 46 A.B.A.J. 646, 647 (1960).
3 2 As long as these screening procedures exist, the only way indigents can be afforded equal
benefit of the review process is through ungrudging acceptance of the Coppedge requirement
by federal prosecutors and courts of appeals. There is evidence that federal prosecutors often
oppose motions for leave of appeal in forma pauperis and file motions to dismiss the appeal
as frivolous without regard to the Supreme Court's interpretation of "good faith" in Coppedge.
Jones v. United States, 266 F.2d 924, 925 n.2 (1959). See Report of the Attorney General's
Committee on Poverty and the Administration of Criminal Justice, ch. 4, pp. 98-104 (1963).
For an example of a court of appeals' uncertainty about and apparent dissatisfaction with
the Supreme Court's requirement, see Robinson v. United States, 304 F.2d 805 (8th Cir. 1962).
[Vol. 51:970
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indigents in the federal courts are still burdened with many disadvantages com-
pared with wealthy appellants, some of which are likely to affect the quality of
representation afforded by appointed counsel. An indigent who wishes to appeal
must apply to the trial court for leave to appeal in forma pauperis. The applica-
tion must contain allegations of financial incapacity and a statement of the argu-
ments relied upon in seeking appellate review. Because the indigent is not given
the aid of counsel at this stage the application is often inexpertly prepared. This
places him at a disadvantage initially since the trial court's certification is in
part based on the application, and the certification is given weight by the appel-
late court when reviewing the trial court's denial of leave to proceed in forma
pauperis.
33
Perhaps the greatest burden placed on indigents in the federal courts is the lack
of an adequate transcript. New counsel appointed for the appeal is required to
advance reasons why the in forma pauperis appeal should be allowed, but the
courts of appeals are under no duty to afford the indigent a transcript of the trial
proceeding upon this appeal. 3 4 Only if the substance of claims made or issues
sought to be raised cannot adequately be ascertained from the face of the applica-
tion must a transcript be provided. Even then it need only be sufficiently com-
plete to enable the indigent to make a showing that the trial court's certification
is wrong and that he should be allowed to appeal in forma pauperis.3 5 Thus, newly
appointed counsel must consult with trial counsel and often must make an inde-
pendent investigation of the case in order to determine which points of error must
be raised in order to obtain a transcript. If no error can be found, appointed coun-
sel must proceed with the appeal without a transcript since he is not entitled to
one in order to familiarize himself with the case and search for error.3 6 If the
court of appeals considers only error raised in the indigent's original application
for leave to appeal in forma pauperis, counsel appointed later will have only the
parts of the transcript relating to errors claimed by the indigent when he, without
aid of counsel, prepared the petition for the in forma pauperis appeal.
Appointed counsel, therefore, is burdened not only by delays due to the in
forma pauperis procedure itself but also by obstacles to adequately briefing and
arguing the appeal on the merits. Counsel may find it difficult to give adequate
representation because of such a time-consuming process, particularly since he win
receive no compensation in the federal courts.
It is evident that the in forma pauperis screening procedure places burdens
on indigents not encountered by wealthy appellants with respect to both access
to review and adequate representation by counsel. Although the Coppedge require-
ments are primarily based on an interpretation of the in forma pauperis statute,
37
33 The consideration to be given the trial court's certification is unclear in view of the strict
standard to be used by the courts of appeals, but the Supreme Court has stated that it is
entitled to "weight" or "great weight." Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 446 (1962);
Johnson v. United States, 352 U.S. 565, 566 (1957).
In order to satisfy the requirements of Douglas, the trial court's certification that the
appeal is not taken in good faith should create no presumption upon appellate review. Other-
wise, the indigent would be burdened by a predetermination made without benefit of counsel
that his appeal is without merit, exactly the procedure attacked in Douglas.
34 See Johnson v. United States, 352 U.S. 565 (1957).
85 Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 446 (1962).
30 See Ingram v. United States, 315 F.2d 29 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
37 See Hyser v. Reed, 318 F.2d 225, 238 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
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the Court noted Griffin and said that in requiring such equality of opportunity it
had been impelled by considerations beyond the corners of the statute to provide
for equal treatment of indigents to the greatest degree possible within the statu-
tory framework . 8 Now that Douglas has emphasized the need for equality in the
kind of appeal afforded, one may well consider whether the demands of equal pro-
tection can any longer be satisfied within this framework. As long as the statutory
procedure exists, however, the courts of appeals can follow the suggestion of Jus-
tices Stewart and Brennan of granting leave to appeal in forma pauperis as a
matter of course and then appointing counsel to brief and argue on the merits.30
Frivolous appeals of indigents and wealthy appellants would then be treated alike
and disposed of by granting motions to dismiss. This practice would afford each
indigent the benefit of counsel and an adequate transcript in every case and
eliminate unjust delays caused by the two-step in forma pauperis procedure.40
Disadvantages suffered by indigents in these procedures cannot be justified on
the grounds of avoiding floods of frivolous appeals. It has not been shown that
in forma pauperis appeals are distinguishable from paid appeals with regard to
merit. 41 The small number of in forma pauperis appeals in the federal district
courts do not place great burdens on courts or appointed counsel, so the extra
burden of providing a free appeal for all indigents would not be unbearable. 42
C. Subsequent Appellate Proceedings
Douglas explicitly excluded from its holding any decision as to whether counsel
must be appointed when an indigent seeks a discretionary hearing before the
California Supreme Court or review by the United States Supreme Court by
appeal as of right or by petition for writ of certiorari. The Court, however, implied
that refusal to appoint counsel in these situations might not amount to invidious
38 Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 446-47 (1962).
39Id. at 455 (concurring opinion) ; see also Ehrenhaft, supra note 31.
40 See generally Report of the Attorney General's Committee, supra note 32. The report
noted a case arising in the District of Columbia in which the defendant was indicted on De-
cember 13, 1960. After conviction and sentencing his application for leave to appeal in forma
pauperis was denied by the trial court and the court of appeals. On certiorari, the Supreme
Court vacated and remanded for consideration in the light of Coppedge. After considering the
appeal on the merits, the court of appeals, on December 13, 1962, reversed and remanded with
directions to enter judgment n.o.v. and discharge the appellant.
41 See Jones v. United States, 266 F.2d 924, 926 (D.C. Cir. 1959). The court notes that
from September 1, 1957, to February 28, 1959, it had decided 24 appeals in which it had
granted leave to appeal in forma pauperis although the district court had certified that they
were not in good faith. It reversed the convictions in 11 cases, and 6 were affirmed by split
decisions. Thus, in 17 of the 24 cases in which the trial court had denied leave to appeal
in forma pauperis at least one judge of the appellate court thought the conviction should be
reversed.
In Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438 (1962), the Court states that statistics com-
piled in the court below illustrate the undeniable fact that there come to that court as many
meritorious in forma pauperis appeals as paid appeals and that "no a priori justification can
be found for considering them, as a class, to be more frivolous than those in which costs have
been paid." Id. at 449.
42 The fear that allowing in forma pauperis appeals as a matter of course would engender
a flood of frivolous appeals seems to be without foundation. By far the greater number of
convictions in federal district courts are on pleas of guilty or nolo contendere; and except pos-
sibly in the District of Columbia, of the criminal appeals docketed, comparatively few are
taken in forma pauperis. Report of the Attorney General's Committee, supra note 32, at 92-104.
[Vol:97o
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discrimination since the indigent has already had one appeal decided on the merits
with benefit of counsel. 43 This limitation seems justifiable even though indigents
are burdened to some extent by lack of counsel in discretionary proceedings.
Under the current practice of the United States Supreme Court, counsel is
usually never appointed to assist the indigent in the preparation of his petition
for certiorari, briefs, or memorandum in support of any other motion.44 When the
indigent has filed his motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis along with
the petition for writ of certiorari, the Supreme Court will initially consider the
petition for writ of certiorari without requiring docket or advance deposit of court
fees. If the petition is denied, no ruling need be made on the in forma pauperis
motion. Only if the petition is granted will the Court consider the motion and will
appoint counsel and procure a transcript if the decision is favorable. In the
case of an indigent, therefore, the Court is usually without the aid of briefs pre-
pared by counsel when considering whether to review the merits.45 The financially
able petitioner can have the Court consider briefs prepared by his counsel before
the Court decides whether to grant the writ of certiorari. 46
The present California Supreme Court practice of appointing counsel for an
indigent seeking a discretionary hearing is very similar to the practice of the
United States Supreme Court; counsel is usually appointed only if the applica-
tion for a hearing is granted.47 The court will not have the benefit of counsel's
research and briefing before deciding whether to grant a hearing. Similar in-
equality is found in the discretionary procedures of many other state courts of
last resort.48
Much the same inequality is also encountered in the United States Supreme
Court practice of considering appeals as of right. Although some appellants are
entitled to review as a matter of right,49 the Court disposes of a large number of
these cases without briefs or oral argument50 by first requiring a jurisdictional
statement and then entertaining motions to dismiss or affirm.51 Counsel is only
appointed if the Court decides to hear oral argument. Since preparation of the
jurisdictional statement requires legal training and since the appellant is entitled
to file a brief, indigents are as burdened by their lack of counsel as in preparing
petitions for certiorari.
43 The Court emphasized that it was dealing with the first appeal and the one and only
appeal as of right. Douglas v. United States, 372 U.S. 353, 356-57 (1963).
44 STER, SuPEs CouaR PRACTcE §§ 6-11 to 6-13 (3d ed. 1962). Appointed counsel is
usually under no obligation to stay on after final action by the court of appeals. Boskey, The
Right to Counsel in Appellate Proceedings, 45 M=. L. REv. 783, 796 (1961).
45 Only about 15% of indigents have the benefit of counsel at the time the court decides
on the petition for certiorari. Stewart, The Indigent Defendant and the Supreme Court of the
United States, 58 LEGAL Am REv. 3 (1960).
46 See Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 358 (1963) (Clark, J., dissenting).
47 Appellate counsel, however, may voluntarily perform the duty of petitioning for re-
hearing and for hearing in the supreme court. If the petition is granted, the court will usually
appoint the counsel who argued the appeal. Interview with Justice Peters, Associate Justice,
California Supreme Court, in San Francisco, September, 1963.
48 See Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 360 (1963) (separate opinion of Harlan, J.).
49 28 U.S.C. §§ 1254, 1257 (1958).
50 "[A]t least fifty per cent of the appeals are dismissed or the judgments affirmed upon
consideration of the jurisdictional statements before the records are printed and without oral
argument." Willey, Jurisdictional Statements on Appeals to U.S. Supreme Court, 31 A.BAJ.
239 (1945) ; see generally, The Supreme Court, 1961 Term, 76 H:ARv. L. Rnv. 54, 81-82 (1962).
51 US. Sup. CT. R. 15-16.
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The degree of inequality suffered by indigents, however, is not as great as at
first appears. Inequality is not present as far as oral argument is concerned since
petitions for hearing and certiorari are considered in conference without appear-
ance of counsel or oral argument whether the appellant has hired counsel or not.
5 2
Only after the petition is granted does a court hear oral argument, and by then
counsel will have been appointed for the indigent. Moreover, after Douglas, most
indigents will have had the benefit of counsel for their initial appeal and can there-
fore submit the briefs prepared by such counsel for that appeal to the Supreme
Court along with the petition for certiorari or jurisdictional statement. Although
the difficulty of persuading a court that the petitioner's case merits oral argument
requires expert assistance, the ultimate prejudice suffered by indigents is less in
discretionary proceedings than at the first appeal, since only a small number of
appeals or petitions for certiorari, whether paid or not, are heard on the merits
and a smaller number yet reversed.
53
Consideration must also be given to the practical burdens imposed now that
equal protection has required states to appoint counsel on criminal appeals. Ap-
pointment of counsel for all indigents who seek to file petitions would impose
heavy burdens on the bar and the courts. Great numbers of petitions for certiorari
in forma pauperis are filed in the United States Supreme Court each year and by
far the greater number of them are frivolous.5 4 Most of these petitions come from
prisoners, and although it would be of great help to the courts to have the peti-
tions prepared by counsel,55 neither the advantage afforded to the courts nor to the
indigent seems to justify the imposition of such a burden.50
II
COLLATERAL ATTACK PROCEEDINGS
Although Douglas makes no reference to collateral proceedings, its equal pro-
tection rationale is easily extended to them. Although collateral remedies are gen-
erally considered to be civil in nature, they are obviously closely related to
criminal procedures; 57 and in cases where no appeal was taken or where issues
raised in the collateral petition were not considered on appeal, the collateral rem-
edy may be the first and only opportunity for review of constitutional and juris-
dictional issues. Most petitions are filed in propria persona, yet most jurisdictions
have not developed meaningful standards for appointing counsel.5 8
52STERN, SUpREx COURT PRACTIcE §§ 6-11 to 6-13 (3d ed. 1962); 3 WxTKIN, CALI-
FORNIA PROCEDURE 2408 (1st ed. 1954).
53 In the 1961 term the U.S. Supreme Court granted only 3.4% of the 1093 petitions for
certiorari in forma pauperis. On the appellate docket only 13.5% of the 669 petitions for cer-
tiorari were granted. All but one of the 44 in forma pauperis appeals were summarily dismissed.
The Supreme Court, 1961 Term, 76 HARv. L. REv. 54, 81 (1962). See Douglas v. California,
372 U.S. 353, 358 (1963) (Clark, J., dissenting).
54 The Court dismissed about 96% of petitions for certiorari and appeals in forma pauperis
without formal consideration in 1961. Ibid. See generally Douglas, The Supreme Court and
Its Case Load, 45 CoaRari L.Q. 401 (1960).
55 Stewart, supra note 45 at 7.
50 It has been suggested, however, that what the sixth amendment requires of the courts
of appeals it should likewise require of the Supreme Court. Boskey, supra note 44 at 798.
57 See note 66 infra.
58 See generally People v. Brown, 55 Cal. 2d 64, 69, 357 P.2d 1072, 1075, 9 Cal. Rptr. 816,
819 (Traynor, J., concurring), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 970 (1960) ; Boskey, supra note 44 at 799;
Note, 61 CoLux. L. REv. 681, 696-703 (1961).
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Collateral attack procedures vary greatly. They usually consist of the com-
mon law remedies of habeas corpus and coram nobis, but some jurisdictions have
augmented or entirely replaced these traditional remedies with special statutory
procedures. The practice with respect to appointment of counsel varies with the
particular procedure.
A. State Collateral Proceedings
The problem of appointing counsel in state collateral proceedings is encoun-
tered primarily in states which have preserved the common law collateral remedies
which do not embody the principles of ordinary res judicata to alleviate the burden
of successive petitions by the same prisoner. The burden of considering successive
petitions makes courts reluctant to appoint counsel for an indigent each time he
seeks to petition.
Habeas corpus is an extraordinary post-conviction remedy generally used to
gain relief from illegal confinement by testing the jurisdiction of the convicting
court or the constitutionality of the conviction.59 Since it is considered a civil pro-
ceeding, separate and distinct from the criminal proceedings under which the
prisoner was convicted, most states have held that there is no constitutional right
to appointment of counsel at any stage in state habeas corpus proceedings.60 In
California, counsel is appointed at the discretion of the court, but usually only if
the petition for the writ presents sufficient allegations and factual support to war-
-rant the court in granting an order to show cause and providing some type of
hearing. 61 Thus, in California the indigent is without the aid of counsel in prepar-
ing the petition and often during the hearing as well.
The coram nobis remedy has been largely replaced by habeas corpus in most
states and is now more restricted than it had been at common law.62 The states
have limited the remedy to allegations based on facts not appearing in the record
which if known at the trial would have required the court by law to act differ-
ently.63 When used in this manner, a coram nobis hearing may be the first trial
of the factual issue presented, and an appeal may well be considered to be the first
appeal as of right from the judgment.6 Moreover, although coram nobis is also
generally considered to be a civil action,65 California has considered it to be part
59 See, e.g., People ex rel. Wiseman v. Nierstheimer, 401 Ill. 260, 81 N.E.2d 900 (1948) ;
Application of Sefton, 73 Nev. 2, 306 P.2d 771, cert. denied, 354 U.S. 914 (1957); Roehm v.
Woodruff, 64 N.M. 278, 327 P.2d 339 (1958); Butt v. Graham, 6 Utah 2d 133, 307 P.2d 892
(1957).60 See People ex rel. Ross v. Ragan, 391 Ill. 419, 63 N.E.2d 874 (1945), cert. denied, 327
U.S. 801 (1946); In re Pelke's Petition, 139 Mont. 628, 365 P.2d 936 (1961); Commonwealth
ex rel. Johnson v.,Burke, 172 Pa. 389, 93 A.2d 876 (1953).
61 E.g., In re Gonsalves, 48 Cal. 2d 638, 311 P.2d 483 (1957) ; In re Atchley, 48 Cal. 2d
408, 310 P.2d 15 (1957); see also People v. Brown, 55 Cal. 2d 64, 69, 357 P.2d 1072, 1075,
9 Cal. Rptr. 816, 819 (1960) (concurring opinion).62 Ex parte Lindley, 29 Cal. 2d 709, 177 P.2d 918 (1947); People v. Reid, 195 Cal. 249,
232 Pac. 457 (1924); Sanders v. State, 85 Ind. 318 (1882). In New York coram nobis has
become the major collateral remedy since habeas corpus is limited to jurisdictional errors.
Cf. People v. Silverman, 3 N.Y.2d 200, 144 N.E.2d 10, 165 N.Y.S.2d 11 (1957). See generally
Note, 61 CoLum. L. REv. 681, 692 (1961).
63 Keane v. State, 164 Md. 685, 166 AUt. 410 (1933). See People v. Gilbert, 25 Cal. 2d 422,
154 P.2d 657 (1944) ; People v. Lumbley, 8 Cal. 2d 752, 68 P.2d 354 (1937).
64 In California denial of coram nobis is appealable as an order made after judgment.
CA.. PEN. CoDE § 1237; People v. Martinez, 88 Cal. App. 2d 767, 199 P.2d 375 (1948).6 5 See People v. Gilbert, 25 Cal. 2d 422, 154 P.2d 657 (1944) ; State v. Ray, 111 Kan. 350,
207 Pac. 192 (1922).
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of the proceedings in the criminal case to which it relates, with respect to provid-
ing a free transcript to an indigent for a coram nobis appeal.,, Thus, in California,
appeals from judgments on coram nobis petitions are very similar to the proce-
dures to which Douglas is directly applicable. As yet, however, California has not
considered Douglas as imposing any requirements on coram nobis appeals.0 7
Although Douglas is not likely to have any immediate effect on collateral pro-
ceedings,68 the extension of equal protection to right to counsel in the post-
conviction review area emphasizes the need for appointing counsel in those cases
where fair and adequate collateral proceedings require assistance of counsel. Now
that Douglas has given counsel to every indigent at the primary appellate level,
perhaps some selectivity should be used in appointing counsel for collateral pro-
ceedings. The great number of habeas corpus petitions filed in state and federal
courts would make appointment of counsel for every indigent seeking to petition
burdensome in the extreme.69 Furthermore, most of these petitions are frivolous
and are dismissed without a hearing. Those without counsel do not suffer great
disadvantages since courts usually do not demand that prisoners comply with
technicalities in petitioning, but only that they give a frank disclosure of the fac-
tual basis of their contentions.7" Equal protection, therefore, should not require
that counsel be afforded every indigent who seeks to petition. Once a hearing is
granted, however, the need for counsel becomes greater, as does the inequality
suffered by the petitioner without counsel. Because of the flexibility of hearing
procedures in most courts, 71 there should be no absolute requirement of appoint-
ment at the hearing; the courts, however, should exercise their discretion in ap-
pointing counsel with an eye to the equality demanded for a fair procedure in
Douglas.
By providing fairer and more effective collateral attack procedures the states
will avoid the necessity for the use of habeas corpus by the federal courts when
state post-conviction procedures have proved inadequate. Adequate representa-
tion by counsel in collateral proceedings as well as on direct appeal would sig-
66 People v. Paiva, 31 Cal. 2d 503, 190 P.2d 604 (1948).67 In People v. Miller, 219 A.C.A. 139, 32 Cal. Rptr. 660 (1963), the court distinguished
a coram nobis appeal from a direct appeal on the ground that the coram nobis remedy is purely
a court-made proceeding in the nature of a collateral attack. Counsel is appointed for appeals
from coram nobis judgments at the discretion of the court. The California Supreme Court
denied a hearing in Miller on October 1, 1963.68 In Partain v. Municipal Court, 215 A.C.A. 477, 30 Cal. Rptr. 300 (1963), the district
court apparently adopted the Hyde test, see note 3 supra, for deciding whether to appoint
counsel for a hearing on a petition for a writ of mandate and writ of habeas corpus. The court
held Douglas inapplicable to an appeal from a denial of the writs. But see Dias v. State, 155
So. 2d 662 (Fla. App. 1963), in which the court held that since Douglas, equal protection also
requires appointment of counsel on appellate review of collateral proceedings.69 Res judicata is generally inapplicable to habeas corpus. See Nicolay v. Kill, 161 Kan.
667, 170 P.2d 823 (1946); Shoemaker v. Dowd, 232 Ind. 602, 115 N.E.2d 443 (1953). The
petition will usually be denied, however, when it is based on the same grounds set forth in
a previous petition which was denied and there has been no change in fact or law affecting
the issues or when the petition is based on grounds known but not asserted at the time of
a former petition. See In re Horowitz, 33 Cal. 2d 534, 203 P.2d 513 (1949) ; In re De La Roi,
28 Cal. 2d 264, 169 P.2d 363 (1946).
70 See People v. Brown, 55 Cal. 2d 69, 357 P.2d 1072, 1975, 9 Cal. Rptr. 816, 819 (1960)
(concurring opinion) ; Ex parte Swan, 34 Cal. 2d 300, 209 P.2d 793 (1949).71 E.g., Lee v. Kindelan, 80 RI. 212, 95 A.2d 51, cert. denied, 345 U.S. 1000 (1953);
Whipple v. Smith, 33 Wash. 2d 615, 206 P.2d 510 (1949).
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nificantly reduce federal interference with state criminal judgments.7 2 Moreover,
due to the delicate state-federal relationship in this area, federal courts are reluc-
tant to appoint counsel for state indigent prisoners except in unusual circum-
stances. 73 The burden thus rests with the states to provide the necessary assistance
of counsel at the collateral attack level.74
In an attempt to prevent federal interference with the state administration of
criminal law and to relieve the state courts from burdens in considering successive
collateral attack petitions by the same prisoner, some states have enacted special
statutory post-conviction remedies designed to provide a full review of constitu-
tional issues and, by applying waiver rules, to limit the number of attacks on the
conviction by the same prisoner.1 5 Because principles of res judicata are applied,
there is a definite need for assistance of counsel in order to assure that an indigent
does not unintentionally waive constitutional claims by failing to raise them at
the hearing. Most states offering the procedure have met the need by providing
for a right to appointment at the hearing76 and one state has also provided for
counsel on appeal from the hearing decision.1 7 Since a full hearing with the aid of
counsel is given in every case, the indigent is guaranteed a fair collateral proceed-
ing. Such statutes solve the problem of hesitance to appoint counsel in habeas
corpus procedures where courts havebeen burdened by successive petitions from
the same prisoner.
B. Federal Collateral Proceedings
Separate procedures exist in the federal courts for collateral attacks on state
and federal convictions. The common law remedies of habeas corpus7 8 and coram
nobis79 are used primarily to review state convictions, while a special statutory
7 2 See National Association of Attorneys General, REPORT O THE COMMU=E ON HABEAS
CoRpus, pp. 204-12 (1960), which quotes the following excerpt from a speech delivered by
Justice Brennan in 1960:
It is unfortunate, but true ... that too many states' post-conviction procedures are
not adequate. Indeed many which in form are adequate require representation by a
skilled lawyer. Until the states provide procedures adequate to permit a hearing and
adjudication of federal constitutional claims, I see no alternative but the provision
of a federal habeas corpus procedure for determination of the claims.
Id. at pp. 210-11.
73 "Except under most unusual circumstances, an attorney ought not to be appointed by
a federal court for the purpose of trying to find something wrong with a state judgment of
conviction." Anderson v. Heinze, 258 F.2d 478, 484 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 889 (1958).
See Schlette v. California, 284 F.2d 827 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 940 (1960) ; Nuhlen-
broich v. Heinze, 281 F.2d 881 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 873 (1960).
Should this delicate state-federal relationship operate to impose burdens on the poor that
are not put on the rich in these proceedings?
74 But see notes 85 and 92 infra; Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963). The expanding use
of federal habeas corpus indicates that the federal courts have fully accepted the burden of
providing fair collateral relief where state collateral procedures prove inadequate.
75 The Oregon Post-Conviction Hearing Act replaces the common law writs and applies
res judicata. ORE. REv. STAT. §§ 138.510-680, 34.330 (1959). The Illinois Post-Conviction
Hearing Act does not replace the common law writs. It was designed primarily for keeping
the adjudication of constitutional issues at a local level. LLz. REv. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 826-32 (1959).
See generally Jenner, The Illinois Post-Conviction Hearing Act, 9 F.R.D. 347 (1950). North
Carolina has enacted a similar statute. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 15-217 to 222 (Supp. 1961).
7 6 ORE. REv. STAT. § 138.590(3) (1959) ; ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 829 (1959) ; N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 15-219 (1953). But see MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, §§ 645 A-J (Supp. 162).
77 ORE. REv. STAT. § 138.500(1) (1959).
78 U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 9; 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241-54 (1948).
7 0 See United States v. Morgan, 202 F.2d 67 (2d Cir. 1953), aff'd, 346 U.S. 502 (1954).
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proceeding, 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1958), is provided as a substitute for the use of
these common law remedies by federal prisoners. The procedures are substantially
identical, however, since the remedy under section 2255 affords federal prisoners
the same rights as they had previously enjoyed in habeas corpus proceedings.80
Courts of appeals have held that the Constitution does not require appoint-
ment of counsel in every habeas corpus proceeding since habeas corpus is consid-
ered a civil action and the sixth amendment therefore is not applicable.81 Section
2255 itself gives no right to counsel. The duty to appoint counsel varies with the
particular procedure, being governed primarily by the requirements of fifth
amendment due process and the proper exercise of the court's discretion.82 The
federal courts generally have not appointed counsel to assist the indigent in peti-
tioning the court.83 Furthermore, except in a small number of cases, courts have
not appointed counsel for a hearing on the merits.8 4
The United States Supreme Court, however, has recently formulated rather
rigid guides which must be used by the federal courts in determining whether to
grant a full evidentiary hearing on a habeas corpus petition. 85 Since the Court has
held that the same rights must be afforded in section 2255 proceedings as in habeas
corpus actions,88 the mandatory hearing requirements doubtless apply also to sec-
tion 2255 proceedings. The demand for these full hearings greatly increases the
need for counsel. An evidentiary hearing entails a fact-finding process similar to
the original trial procedure; it is, therefore, difficult to see how a prisoner can
have a fair evidentiary hearing without the aid of counsel.87 Moreover, in Sanders
80 Under the statutory- procedure, a motion to vacate brought in the sentencing court
replaces habeas corpus petitions by federal prisoners in the nearest district court to the federal
prison. The statute was seen to provide for the same previous habeas corpus rights, but in a
more convenient forum. United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205 (1952).8 1United States v. Wilkins, 281 F.2d 707 (2d Cir. 1960); Graeber v. Schneckloth, 241
F.2d 710 (9th Cir. 1957); Jefferson v. Heinze, 201 F. Supp. 606 (N.D. Cal. 1962). Equal pro-
tection, however, should have no less application to habeas corpus because of its civil nature.
Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708 (1961), held that equal protection requires states to waive
filing fees when an indigent seeks to apply for a writ of habeas corpus or to appeal from a
habeas corpus proceeding. The Court stated that "the availability of a procedure to regain
liberty lost through criminal process cannot be made contingent upon a choice of labels." Id. at
712. See also Dillon v. United States, 307 F.2d 445 (9th Cir. 1962) ; Green v. United States,
158 F. Supp. 804 (D. Mass.), aff'd, 256 F.2d 483 (1st Cir. 1958).82 Ellis v. United States, 313 F.2d 848 (7th Cir. 1963) ; Dillon v. United States, 307 F.2d
445 (9th Cir. 1962); United States v. Wilkins, 281 F.2d 707 (2d Cir. 1960); Anderson v.
Heinze, 258 F.2d 479 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 889 (1958).
83 The petition usually must present at least "ostensible merit." E.g., Jefferson v. Heinze,
201 F. Supp. 606, 607 (N.D. Cal. 1962).
84 There is particular reluctance to appoint counsel when reviewing state convictions. See
note 73 supra. See generally Boskey, supra note 44 at 783 nn.57-58.
85 An evidentiary hearing is required if
(1) the merits of the factual dispute were not resolved in the state hearing; (2) the
state factual determination is not fairly'supported by the record as a whole; (3) the
fact-finding procedure employed by the state court was not adequate to provide a
full and fair hearing; (4) there is a substantial allegation of newly discovered evi-
dence; (5) the material facts were not adequately developed at the state-court
hearing or (6) for any reason it appears that the state trier of fact did not afford
the habeas applicant a full and fair fact hearing.
Townsend v. Saiu, 372 U.S. 293, 313 (1963). In other cases where the material facts are dis-
puted holding such a hearing is at the discretion of the court. Id. at 318.
80 See note 80 supra.
87 The Court stated that it was the typical and not the rare case in which constitutional
claims turn upon the resolution of controverted factual issues. Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293,
312 (1963).
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v. United States,88 the Court indicated that counsel should be appointed to aid
the indigent when the district court is determining whether a full evidentiary hear-
ing should be given.89 The need for counsel would be even greater, of course,
during the hearing itself.
Although assistance of counsel is necessary in these federal collateral proceed-
ings, the increased requirements for hearings and appointment of counsel impose
great burdens on the federal courts.90 Since res judicata is not applicable to these
procedures, a prisoner may usually have successive petitions considered as long as
he raises some new ground for relief each time,91 and the United States Supreme
Court has recently indicated that the federal courts should be even more liberal
in allowing successive petitions.9 2 The courts are asked to consider great numbers
of collateral petitions, and by far the greater number are frivolous. 93
Certainly some procedure must be developed to minimize the burden imposed
by affording indigents adequate representation. 4 In Sanders the Court notes that
the individual districts may develop their own procedure in attempting to handle
the problem of successive section 2255 motions. The Court said that judges are
not required to limit the decision on the first motion to the grounds narrowly
alleged but are free to adopt any appropriate means for inquiry into the legality
of the prisoner's detention in order to ascertain all possible grounds upon which
the prisoner might claim to be entitled to relief. At least one district judge has
adopted the practice of making a pre-trial order in section 2255 proceedings that
"all issues that might effect the validity of the criminal judgment and sentence be
presented at this hearing."9 5 Counsel is automatically appointed and the fullest
review of the conviction possible is provided in the hope that the court will not
again be required to entertain new section 2255 petitions from the same prisoner
or that such petitions might be disposed of without requiring a hearing, presence of
the petitioner, or appointment of counsel. Since counsel is appointed as a matter
of course, the procedure presents an adequate solution to the problem of providing
equal benefit of counsel at the hearing, although inequality remains at the appel-
late level. The procedure may not be completely effective since it may be difficult
to bring before the court all possible grounds for relief that might ever be raised.
It does, however, provide at least a partial solution to providing indigents with
88 373 U.S. 1 (1963).
89 Id at 21.
00 See United States v. Wilkins, 281 F.2d 707 (2d Cir. 1960). Cf. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S.
443, 536 (1963) (concurring opinion).
91 Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1 (1963) ; Waley v. Johnson, 316 U.S. 101 (1942);
Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309 (1915).
92 "Controlling weight may be given to denial of a prior application for federal habeas
corpus or § 2255 relief only if (1) the same ground presented in the subsequent application
was determined adversely to the appellant on the prior application, (2) the prior determina-
tion was on the merits, and (3) the ends of justice would not be served by reaching the merits
of the subsequent application." Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 15 (1963).
93 Of the 7,041 habeas corpus petitions disposed of by the federal courts in the twelve
year period ending in 1957, only 98 were successful and only 28 gained release by federal court
order from state penal institutions. National Association of Attorneys General, REPORT O TEE
Comiara oN HABEAS CoRpus, p. 207 (1960). See Reitz, Federal Habeas Corpus: Post-
Conviction Remedy for State Prisoners, 108 U. PA. L. REv. 461, 478 (1960).
94 One circuit court has noted that if the test were equal treatment for every indigent
before the bar, appointment of counsel would be required when any substantial issue is raised
at the hearing. Dillon v. United States, 307 F.2d 445, 447 (9th Cir. 1962).
95 Carter, Pre-Trial Suggestions for Section 2255 Cases, 32 F.R.D. 393 (1963). (Emphasis
added.)
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counsel and a fair procedure while mitigating the burdens of successive section
2255 motions. The procedure would also be helpful in habeas corpus review of
state convictions. The fact that habeas corpus is a nonstatutory remedy should
not preclude the use of such a procedure.
I
CONCLUSION
Douglas is likely to have effects on criminal proceedings generally. From the
proposition that "there can be no equal justice where the kind of an appeal a man
enjoys 'depends on the amount of money he has,'"96 it follows that since a man's
wealth has no relation to his guilt, there should be no differences in criminal pro-
cedures stemming solely from differences in wealth. The minimum requirement
approach of due process is not used and it only remains to be seen whether the
Supreme Court will now apply equal protection to benefit of counsel at the tria
0 7
and in post-conviction review proceedings beyond the level of the first appeal. 8
Equal protection may also be applied to certain quasi-criminal proceedings 0 and
to areas other than relating to benefit of counsel, such as cost of trial prepara-
tion'0 0 and bail.' 10
96 Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 355 (1963).
97 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), was based on due process and required ap-
pointment of counsel at the trial only in felony cases. Since Douglas makes no distinction as
to the seriousness of the offense, the application of equal protection to right of trial counsel
may extend the right to misdemeanor cases as well.
98 Since Douglas is an extension of Griffin, it should be noted that Griffin has been applied
to subsequent appellate proceedings as well as to habeas corpus and coram nobis. See note 6
supra. But see note 43 supra.
99 Since equal protection is an element of constitutional due process, it seems likely that
the prohibition against unfair discrimination will be read into due process rights afforded by
statute. In federal parole and probation revocation proceedings the due process requirements
are based on statutory interpretation and not on any constitutional right, but there has recently
been an increased demand for fair procedure based on this statutory due process. See Robins
v. Reed, 269 F.2d 242 (D.C. Cir. 1959); Moore v. Reid, 246 F.2d 654, (D.C. Cir. 1957). Due
process does not now require appointment of counsel for indigent parolees at the parole revo-
cation hearing. Hyser v. Reed, 218 F.2d 225 (1963). But it has been suggested that since pov-
erty bears no more relation to the question of parole violation than to guilt at the trial, the
discrimination against indigents in these proceedings may be so unjustifiable as to be violative
of due process. Id. at 249.
Proceedings under the California Narcotic Commitment Act, CAL. PEN. CODE §§ 6400-
521, are regarded as primarily civil in nature but with criminal overtones. In re David De La 0,
59 A.C. 140, 378 P.2d 793, 28 Cal. Rptr. 489 (1963). However, since the proceedings and the
commitment have many penal characteristics, assistance of counsel is necessary. Although it
might be argued that Douglas is not applicable since it only concerns appeals from criminal con-
victions, the fairest policy would be for the appellate courts to follow the Douglas mandate in
these proceedings also. One difficulty is that counsel cannot be compensated since the proceed-
ings has not been classified as criminal, and California only provides for compensation of attor-
neys appointed for "any appeal or proceeding in a criminal matter." CAL. PEN. CODE § 1241.
100 In the federal courts, indigents are allowed to subpoena witnesses at government
expense, but the indigent must file an affidavit stating the name and address of each witness,
the testimony expected, and how it is material to the defense. FED. R. Cpam. P. 17(b). Thus,
because of indigence, the defendant's case is often revealed to the prosecution. See Smith v.
United States, 312 F.2d 867 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (statements in the affidavits are not compelled
testimony and can be used to impeach the indigent).
101 Surveys indicate that a substantial number of accused persons fail to meet bail require-
ments. Report of the Attorney, General's Committee on Poverty and the Administration of
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But the Supreme Court in Douglas noted that "absolute equality is not re-
quired; lines can be and are drawn and we often sustain them."' 0 2 Lines must be
drawn, however, on the basis of some rational purpose and proper governmental
objective.'0 3 The philosophy of Douglas implies that no degree of discrimination
is proper when it is based on wealth: the amount of money a man has has no
relation to his guilt or to the merits of his case. 0 4 Now that equal protection,
however, has been expanded beyond prohibiting active discrimination to requiring
appointment of counsel, the factors of state expense and burden on appointed
counsel'05 should be considered in relation to the degree of unequal opportunity
encountered in each particular procedure.
Gordon H. Van Kessel
Criminal Justice, table III, p. 134 (1963). Certainly a principal factor is the financial ability
of the accused. See Bandy v. United States, 81 Sup. Ct. 197, 198 (1960), wherein Justice Douglas
notes that to demand a substantial bond which the accused is unable to secure may raise equal
protection problems. See generally Bail: An Ancient Practice Re-examined, 70 YALE L.J. 966
(1961).
'o2 Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 357 (1963).
103 See Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948) ; Tiger v. Texas, 310 U.S. 141 (1940).
l04 But see Norvell v. Illinois, 373 U.S. 420, 423 (1963).
105 Currently, counsel appointed by the federal courts receive no compensation for their
services. The United States Supreme Court pays only the cost of printing the briefs and
attorney's transportation. U.S. Sup. CT. R. 53. Many bills have been introduced in Congress
designed to make funds available to the individual districts either to pay private counsel or
to establish public defender systems. During the 87th Congress five such bills were introduced,
none of which was passed by both houses. S. 655 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961) ; S. 854, 87th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1961) ; S. 1484, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961) ; H.R. 2696, 87th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1961) ; S. 2900, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962). A similar bill was introduced in the 88th Con-
gress which was recommended by the Attorney General's Committee on Poverty and the
Administration of Criminal Justice after much research and investigation. H.R. 5881, 88th
Congress, 1st Sess. (1963). The bill provides for the institution of federal defender systems
and for compensation of private counsel not exceeding $15 per hour. It provides for represen-
tation "through appeal." For an analysis of statutory proposals see Note, 76 HARv. L. Rlv.
579, 607 (1963).
Assigned counsel and public defender systems co-exist in California. See Note, 13 STAN.
L. REv. 522 (1961). Counsel appointed in California to represent a party to any appeal or
proceeding in a criminal matter Is entitled to a reasonable fee. CAL. PEN. CODE § 1241. See
generally Note, 49 CAL. L. REv. 954 (1961). The fees are generally inadequate, particularly
in death penalty cases which put extensive demands on appointed counsel. REPORT OF THE
NATiONAL AssociATiON or DEFENSE LAWYERS TO SENATOR REGAN AND ASSEMBLYMAN WINTON
(1963) indicates a great disparity between fees paid to appointed counsel in death penalty
cases and what these counsel believe would have been a reasonable fee.
Although appointed counsel are generally considered as conscientious as hired counsel,
lack of adequate compensation often operates to discourage experienced attorneys from hand-
ling indigent cases so that indigents must settle for young and inexperienced counsel. See
generally Douglas, In Forma Pauperis Practice in the United States, N.H.B.J. 5, 10 (1959).
The burden of providing representation for indigents now rests primarily upon a small seg-
ment of society: the bar and particularly criminal attorneys. Now that the states and federal
courts have been required to appoint counsel for indigents automatically both at the trial
and on appeal, greater consideration must be given to the problem of who should bear
the increased cost of free counsel.
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